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Abstract: 
The UEFA Champions League revenues continue to grow (€1.3bn in 2016-
17), although previous studies have highlighted a competitive imbalance in 
the competition, and in the leagues supplying teams. UEFA plans to 
increase the allocation of automatic qualifying places to 16 for the top four 
ranked leagues for 2018-19, and alter the financial distribution model. This 
paper analyses the representation, performance and revenue distribution 
by club and UEFA member associations from 2003-04 to 2016-17 with 
reference to the quota changes and future direction. UEFAs priorities are 
split, between meeting their core principles of governing 55 member 
nations, and commercial expectations from leading clubs. The findings 
demonstrate that the current structure offers clubs from England, 
Germany, Italy and Spain the most representation, revenue, and their 
clubs have the strongest performance. The financial benefits of this 
enhanced access are vast. These clubs received €6.61bn (61%) of all 
revenue, with sixteen clubs receiving €5.6bn (52%) overall. The market 
pool element of the distribution model is where the most differences lie, 
calculated by UEFA. Discussions include the benefits and issues with the 
quota changes around representation, revenue and performance, with 
reference to UEFAs aim to offer "fair competition" and "fair distribution" in 
the future. 
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INTRODUCTION  1 
The UEFA Champions League is the premier club competition in European football and 2 
one of the most high profile in world sport (Schokkaert and Swinnen, 2014). This is due 3 
to its ever-increasing prestige, financial power, television exposure and commercial deals. 4 
For example €904.6m was distributed in prize money for the 2013-14 competition 5 
(Plumley and Flint, 2015), rising by over a third to €1.39bn in 2016-17 (UEFA, 2017). 6 
The format of the competition has evolved since it was first contested in 1956 as the 7 
European Champion's Club Cup, contested by European league winners only. Originally, 8 
16 clubs entered in the first round from 15 different nations. The 'Champions League' 9 
brand was not introduc d until 1992, and non-title winning clubs were first granted entry 10 
in 1997, then expanded to a maximum of four clubs per country in 1999 (via the 11 
preliminary qualifying stages which occur before the groups stage). The current format 12 
consists of eight groups of four playing in a round robin format, with the top two teams 13 
advancing to the round of 16. This has been the case since the format was changed for the 14 
2003-04 season, modified from a double group stage format.  From 2018-19 UEFA are 15 
changing the qualification quotas to allocate four guaranteed group stage places to the 16 
four leagues with the highest coefficient ranking, an increase from the 11 guaranteed 17 
group stage places in the current structure.  18 
  19 
Research has established that there is a competitive imbalance in European club football, 20 
although both positive and negative implications have been argued.  This paper aims to 21 
outline potential implications of the Champions League qualification quota changes post 22 
2018-19. This is achieved by quantifying four areas of the Champions League between 23 
2003-04 and 2016-17: (1) representation in the competition - clubs (2) representation - 24 
players; (3) performance in the competition; and (4) revenue/prize money allocation. 25 
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Quantifying these four measurements is with an aim to ascertain how the competitive 1 
imbalance present in European leagues (and within the Champions League) rewards clubs 2 
and member associations. By quantifying these four measures, the paper aims to discuss 3 
how the current competition structure and entry allocation rewards those qualifying. It 4 
also considers the policy implications of quota changes through the lens of UEFAs remit 5 
and mission statement, discussing how the proposals for 2018-19 may affect the future 6 
direction of European club football.  7 
 8 
The issue of balance (financial, competition, representation) has been identified by UEFA 9 
as one of their greatest challenges, with President Ceferin (Reuters, 2018) outlining "we 10 
must dare to rethink our models, in particular to establish greater competitive balance. 11 
We must…introduce measures which restore some balance…UEFA is not a bank, what is 12 
the point in generating record-breaking revenues, if it is just an accumulation of wealth?". 13 
 14 
LITERATURE REVIEW 15 
History 16 
The original format was designed to create a competition where equal representation 17 
across the main European leagues was provided, with only league winners included. 18 
Although the first decade was dominated by Real Madrid (who won the first five), then 19 
Benfica (twice) and the two Milan clubs (two for Internatzionale and one for AC Milan), 20 
the representation of the finalists included clubs from 14 countries between 1956 and 21 
1990 (Belgium, England, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 22 
Scotland, Spain, Sweden, (West) Germany, and the Former Yugoslavia). The 1970s and 23 
early 1980s saw dominance by Netherlands (Ajax), Germany (Bayern Munich) and 24 
England (Liverpool, Nottingham Forest, Aston Villa). The mid-eighties to the turn of the 25 
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millennium saw twelve different winners including Red Star Belgrade (Serbia), Steaua 1 
Bucharest (Romania), PSV Eindhoven (Netherlands), FC Porto (Portugal) and 2 
Olympique Marseille (France).  3 
 4 
Since the format change in 2003, the finals of the Champions League has been dominated 5 
by clubs from the four leagues with the most entries; Spain (7 wins, 2 runner-up), 6 
England (3 wins 5 runners-up), Italy (2 wins, 3 runners-up), and Germany (1 win, 3 7 
runners-up). Only clubs from Portugal (1 win) and France (1 runner-up) have made final 8 
appearances from the 31 nations which have teams entering the competition at the group 9 
stage. Porto's victory in 2003-04 was the only victory from outside the four nations with 10 
the most entries since the two group stage format was abolished in 2003. Porto's 11 
victorious year was also the only year where the losing finalist was from outside these 12 
four nations (AS Monaco, France).  13 
 14 
Despite the competition doubling in entrants from 16 to 32, the 'range' of nationalities 15 
represented has remained consistent at 16-18 per season. The quota revisions mean 16 
guaranteed group stage entry for four teams from each of the top four ranked leagues 17 
(from coefficient scores over a rolling five year period), resulting in 16 spaces in total and 18 
50% of all places available (Independent, 2016). This is an increase on the eleven 19 
guaranteed places and four play-off places in the current structure. UEFAs proposal from 20 
2018-19 is to award coefficient scores to individual clubs, not leagues. This will affect 21 
individual clubs not qualifying for the competition, and benefit those clubs frequently 22 
qualifying.  23 
 24 
 25 
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Research setting 1 
The aim of this paper makes reference to an issue which faces UEFA, who are in a 2 
position where there is a potential conflict of priorities between two of their key 3 
administrative roles. Questions remain around whether these two key areas are 4 
compatible or conflicting. This potential conflict is between balancing their overall 5 
governance responsibility (providing opportunities for all their 55 member associations to 6 
access their competitions) with ensuring the larger clubs (and member associations) have 7 
the competitions they require to generate the revenue they desire. With a significant part 8 
of the growing revenues generated by the Champions League based on the sale of TV 9 
rights (Plumley and Flint, 2015), the proposed changes to the competition format brings 10 
this conflict of priorities for UEFA to the fore. Providing support for all clubs is their role 11 
as a governing organisation, whilst also meeting the needs of their larger, more influential 12 
clubs (and member associations) which generate the interest and the revenues via 13 
broadcasters. This is in the context of the threat of potential breakaway leagues such as a 14 
Europe-wide 'super league' comprising the most powerful clubs (Powlowski et al, 2010). 15 
UEFAs rationale for change outlines an aim to "ensure qualification is based on sporting 16 
merit", to have "the right of all associations and their clubs to compete in Europe's elite 17 
club competitions" and to "remain united behind the concepts of solidarity, fair 18 
competition, and fair distribution" (UEFA, 2016b). Ensuring these aims align is a core 19 
challenge for UEFA to navigate.  20 
 21 
Understanding why UEFA have developed this rationale for changing the future 22 
qualification quotas from 2018-19 is linked to issues around competitive balance of the 23 
competition, and the financial distribution model (see President Ceferin's earlier comment, 24 
Reuters, 2018). The quota amendments (UEFA, 2016a) will reassess the coefficient 25 
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calculations to remove national association weighting and make it based on individual 1 
club performance only (UEFA, 2016b), and create a new financial distribution model. 2 
This revised model will see performance payments increase, and market pool payments 3 
decrease. UEFA also outline that the new model will see an increase in payments to clubs 4 
and national associations knocked out in the qualifying phase of the competition.  5 
 6 
Given a large part of the success of the Champions League is based on the TV revenue it 7 
can generate, extending the range of qualifying nations to include lower ranked nations 8 
could potentially reduce rights fees if the 'product' is diminished. The changes coming 9 
into effect in 2018-19 work the other way. By guaranteeing more spaces for higher 10 
ranked leagues, this presents a challenge to UEFAs core jurisdiction as the governing 11 
body. UEFAs mission statement outlines how they aim to be representative and 12 
democratic, acting on behalf 55 national football associations across Europe (UEFA, 13 
2015a). Their objectives include the promotion of football around unity, solidarity and 14 
fair play, ensuring this is without discrimination on any part; safeguarding the values of 15 
European football; promotion and protecting ethical standards; good governance; 16 
maintaining relations with all stakeholders and providing support and safeguarding 17 
member associations, all towards ensuring the overall well-being of the game in Europe 18 
(UEFA, 2015a).  Managing these principles whilst maximising commercial opportunities 19 
is a key challenge for UEFA.  20 
 21 
Previous research on Competitive Balance  22 
Competitive balance refers to a situation where no club has an advantage over others 23 
which is deemed to be unfair, and defines the level of equality of the competing teams 24 
Ramchandani (2010). UEFA have also emphasised this issue as a primary focus for 25 
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European football in the future, using legislation such as Financial Fair Play in an attempt 1 
to make things more balanced (Ramchandani et at, 2018). Although this analysis is not 2 
aiming to test competitive balance, it is an important area to discuss as it influences 3 
potential outcomes from the proposed qualification changes. 4 
 5 
Studies have identified issues with the competitive balance in elite football, both within 6 
domestic leagues and across European competitions. Ramchandani et al (2018) outlined 7 
that there has been a statistically significant decline in competitive balance in four of the 8 
five 'big' leagues (1995-2017), with Serie A (Italy) the only outlier. Pawlowski et al, 9 
(2010) demonstrated that the distribution of revenue in the Champions League (after a 10 
modification of the revenue payment structure) resulted in a decrease in competitive 11 
balance in the top 5 leagues, with Ramchandani et al's study showing that this has not 12 
abated between 2010 and 2017. Plumley and Flint (2015) also identified that the group 13 
stages of the Champions League have a competitive imbalance. UEFAs changes to the 14 
entry quotas for 2018-19 may reduce this imbalance by decreasing the opportunities for 15 
clubs in lower ranked leagues. However, this is in direct contrast to part of the rationale 16 
for implementing change, i.e. allowing access for all member nations to be represented 17 
(UEFA, 2016),  18 
 19 
Regulation of competitions aims to maintain that no team can become so big that they 20 
have an advantage which is against the spirit of that sport. The literature around 21 
competitive balance research in football is contradictory, although is accepted that it has 22 
an influence on demand around aspects including attendance, TV rights and gate receipts 23 
(Wilson et al, 2018). The concept of uncertainty of outcome, where a higher level of 24 
uncertainty results in a greater level of interest (Gratton 2000), has been both supported 25 
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and challenged. Research pointing to a desire from fans for their team to be dominant 1 
(Buraimo & Simmons, 2008; Pawlowski & Anders, 2012) is in contrast to studies where 2 
a detrimental impact may be observed (Morrow, 2008; Ramchandani et al, 2018). Wilson 3 
et al (2018) summarise this with a view that competitive balance is relevant to football 4 
fans but variations may not be large enough to affect the overall demand. In the current 5 
structure, a small group of teams have been consistent qualifiers although this has had a 6 
positive impact on the revenues generated (see Plumley and Flint, 2015; UEFA, 2017). 7 
Ramchandani et al (2018) suggested that, based on a competitive imbalance in four of 8 
Europe's five main leagues, revisiting the revenue distribution systems of domestic 9 
broadcast deals may b  required to make them more equal similar to revenue sharing 10 
agreements demonstrated in professional sports in the United States. Attempts to quell 11 
any threat of a breakaway 'Super League' is also a sub-factor in the historical background 12 
in European football (Telegraph, 2009; Holt, 2007; Vrooman, 2007).  13 
 14 
Powlowski et al (2010) summarised competitive balance literature into within-season 15 
(different teams within leagues) and within-team (a single team over a period of time). 16 
This is applied differently in professional sport depending on the competition, for 17 
example, American team sports, Australian Rules and some professional cricket leagues 18 
have permanent rosters of teams and do not include promotion/relegation in their 19 
competitions like most domestic football leagues. The Champions League is more unique 20 
in terms of determining competitive balance due to factors including; different clubs 21 
qualifying each year, seeding, and its structure (round robin group and two-legged 22 
knockout stages, with a single game final), all of which mean no two competitions are a 23 
direct comparison (Plumley and Flint, 2015).  24 
 25 
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Powlowski et al (2010) outlined how the presence of competitive balance in a 1 
competition is a vital factor to retain interest (demand), and limit risks such as potential 2 
for breakaway leagues, and financial issues for some 'weaker' competing clubs. Results 3 
from Powlowski et al's study outlined how competitive balance in five domestic leagues 4 
has decreased since 2000, citing the changes to the Champions League financial 5 
distribution as an influential source of this decline. Schokkaert and Swinnen (2014) found 6 
that the earlier rounds of the Champions League have become more predictable since its 7 
inception but the later stages of the competition have become less predictable. 8 
 9 
Uncertainty of outcome is an important factor in professional sport, focusing on its role in 10 
demand analysis, and this concept includes individual match outcome, season outcome 11 
and the absence of single club domination (Gratton and Solberg, 2007). Plumley and Flint 12 
(2015) found flaws in the ranking and seeding system used for the group stages by UEFA 13 
(1999-00 to 2013-14), i.e. a competitive imbalance. They also found that those clubs most 14 
commonly in the highest seeding pot have a better performance in the group stages and 15 
are more likely to qualify for the knockout stage which links to Schokkaert and Swinnen 16 
(2014). The impact of an increased allocation of guaranteed group stage qualification for 17 
the most powerful national associations may further this competitive imbalance.  18 
 19 
As outlined by Symanski (2001), if competitive balance is reduced through domination 20 
by a smaller pool of teams it can result in a detrimental impact on the overall interest in a 21 
competition. This does not appear to have diminished interest in the Champions League 22 
competition, the opposite appears true. The revenues generated have continued to 23 
increase since 2003 (see results section) through increased TV and sponsorship and the 24 
cumulative attendances and TV figures have also continued to increase (Schokkaert and 25 
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Swinnen, 2014).  How the increased revenue is allocated to clubs (and leagues) is a key 1 
discussion point with the proposed structural changes to qualification. Palomino and 2 
Rigotti (2000) highlighted that teams want to limit economic competition via income 3 
redistribution models, and leave concerns about the balance of a competition to fans.  4 
 5 
Champions League revenue allocation and market pool 6 
The revenue distribution for each season is split into four areas (1) statutory (2) market 7 
pool (3) performance - games won and (4) performance - round reached. Three of the 8 
four revenue variables are open to fluctuation, the two performance variables and market 9 
pool. The market pool revenue is calculated using different factors, with the relative 10 
value of each national association's television market a primary driver (Plumley and 11 
Flint, 2015). In the current structure, this results in a distribution system which 12 
creates significant variations between national associations depending on their size, 13 
with larger nations receiving a much higher share.  14 
 15 
UEFA attempted to address criticism of the new qualification quota system around 16 
whether it will result in a greater share of revenue for the bigger clubs and associations. 17 
They outline four key expected outcomes to make a 'fairer' allocation (UEFA, 2016a). 18 
First, ensuring clubs are judged by their own performance and not allocated a share based 19 
on the national coefficient, with some recognition for new clubs where the coefficient is 20 
"lower than 20% of the association's coefficient". Second is a historical perspective in the 21 
coefficient calculator, weighted by competition. Third is an increased financial 22 
distribution to all clubs under the fourth expected outcome, a revised four-pillar 23 
distribution system. The revised distribution system will allocate revenue across four key 24 
indicators (1) starting fee, (2) performance (matches won and progression), (3) club 25 
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coefficient and (4) market pool. There will be an increase in the performance element and 1 
a decrease in market pool share. Changing the financial distribution model is set in the 2 
context of the highest ever revenues in the game, but with evidence of loss making in 3 
many elite football clubs due to having an imbalance between income and expenditure 4 
(Barajas and Rodríguez, 2014; Lago et al, 2006). The results section outlines the 5 
disparities in the current system lie in the market pool pillar, therefore this rule change 6 
will be important to track and investigate beyond 2018-19. 7 
 8 
UEFAs seeding model makes it difficult for new entrants to progress in the competition, 9 
and therefore not improving their coefficient rank; and is a model that was not without 10 
criticism for assisting larger clubs (Bevan, 2013). Previous research has outlined that the 11 
Champions League relates most closely to a monopolistic competition due to the 'sale' of 12 
the same product but at different prices (Plumley and Flint, 2015) with the revenue 13 
distribution model the key determinant in setting the different prices. Szymanski and 14 
Késenne (2004) suggest revenue sharing models that deserve detailed scrutiny are those 15 
where the collective sale of broadcast rights generate a significant amount of the revenue 16 
to be divided. They suggested that revenue sharing has the potential to blunt incentives, 17 
produce an uneven distribution of talent within leagues, leading to a decrease in the 18 
competitive balance. Their implication was not that revenue sharing agreements per se 19 
lead to a reduction in competitive balance, but require additional analysis. This is an 20 
interesting concept when applied to the Champions League, where qualification (across 21 
different nations) is the entry requirement. Previous research (Vamplew 2017; Dabscheck, 22 
2018) has also shown that sports leagues can gravitate toward 'cartel-like' behaviour 23 
because they operate under collective agreements (i.e. broadcast deals, fixtures, domestic 24 
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competition structures), and all clubs rely on each other to cooperate under this collective 1 
approach.  2 
 3 
Finally, the globalised nature of club football in the modern era means that clubs recruit 4 
players from across the world game and the range of nationalities represented in 5 
European football have expanded (Bullough et al, 2016). Opportunities to play in the 6 
Champions League, the premier club competition, have the potential to offer the highest 7 
level of experience for players outside internationals. For those players in weaker leagues 8 
with fewer (if any) routes into the Champions League, the desire to migrate to higher 9 
ranked leagues may be an unintended consequence which affects lower ranked 10 
leagues/clubs, and this issue forms part of the discussion. 11 
 12 
METHOD 13 
Research Questions 14 
This research aims to quantify the following areas of the Champions League across the 15 
55 member associations between 2003-04 and 2016-17 with reference to the 2018-19 16 
quota changes: (1) representation in the competition - clubs (2) representation - players; 17 
(3) performance in the competition; and (4) revenue/prize money allocation. 18 
 19 
Measuring performance  20 
This research is contextualised by what is meant by measuring ‘performance’ and what 21 
constitutes 'success' in the Champions League, as this fluctuates for different teams. For 22 
some clubs simply qualifying and receiving the statutory payment is seen as success, 23 
and represents over-performance, for others losing in the final is deemed failure. 24 
Performance and success have different interpretations depending on the objectives 25 
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specified. Common measures can include financial performance and comparisons to 1 
benchmarks to assess performance relative to others (Ramchandani et al, 2018). Put into 2 
context for the Champions League, common and standardised measurements (for clubs 3 
and leagues) can include representation, playing time, revenue received, whether you 4 
qualify, round reached and winning, for example. Success against each of these 5 
measurements can vary in season and across seasons when applied to different clubs. 6 
The relative performance of an organisation should be judged in the context of what 7 
was expected (Ramchandani et al, 2018) or assessed in relation to how performance 8 
relates to milestones and what is deemed success for individual clubs. With this in mind, 9 
the objectives for this research look at quantifying some of the main determinants of 10 
performance and success. 11 
 12 
To meet the aims and objectives of the paper, the results measure (1) revenue distribution, 13 
(2) representation (by clubs, nations and players), and (3) tournament progression 14 
(measured by round reached) across the 14 eligible seasons. First is the financial revenue 15 
distribution (in Euros) from UEFAs (2016c) financial reports (note, 2003-04 to 2005-06 16 
have been converted from Swiss Francs into Euros using the exchange rate from the 17 
corresponding time). These documents report the revenues allocated in the full draw, not 18 
qualifying. Second, performance (by club) is based on the round of the competition 19 
reached in each season in the sample rather than by UEFAs coefficient scores. The 20 
standardised approach to measuring performance for the Champions League is via 21 
UEFAs coefficient scores although they are calculated on a rolling 5-year performance 22 
based on wins/draws and bonus points for progressing through rounds. For this study 23 
there is a need to create a measure to calculate performance for all 14 seasons as the 24 
coefficient rankings are not suitable due to being time bound. This has been devised using 25 
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a 'Round Reached' (RR) calculation following the following scoring system; 1 point for 1 
group stage, 2 points for round of 16, 3 points for quarter finalists, 4 points for semi-2 
finalists, 5 points for runners-up and 6 points for the winners. The scoring system allows 3 
us to calculate overall points and average for the sample timeframe by club and by league. 4 
Third, sub-categories of clubs and national associations are created based on the volume 5 
of entries in the Champions League (see Table 1) in order to understand more about the 6 
representation of nations in the competition, and the cumulative playing data (appearance 7 
and minutes played) from each season. This approach quantifies the representation and 8 
rewards attached to the competition. 9 
 10 
Sample  11 
As outlined earlier, the competition has made alterations to its format, therefore to ensure 12 
consistency the timeframe is from the point where the competition format reverted back 13 
to one group stage in 2003-04. Across these 14 seasons, there have been 448 places 14 
available in the main draw, with 32 teams entering the group stage per season. In this 15 
period, 108 different clubs have competed from 31 different leagues, although 14 of these 16 
leagues have provided five or fewer entries in this period - see Table 1. Overall, 24 clubs 17 
account for 228 entries (51%), and 37 clubs have appeared once. In this sample time 18 
frame (2003-04 to 2016-17), only Arsenal and Real Madrid have been ever-present in the 19 
group stage, with Barcelona, Bayern Munich, Chelsea and Porto missing one season each. 20 
The majority of seasons have seen four entries at the group stage from England (13 21 
seasons) and Spain (12), with other UEFA members not represented in the group stage, 22 
their clubs having been eliminated in the earlier qualifying rounds. 23 
 24 
 25 
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Table 1 Categorisation of Champions League entries 2003-04 to 2016-17 1 
 2 
The maximum number of group stage entries in 14 seasons, based on a maximum limit of 3 
four places per season, is 56. There have been caveats in that e.g. England were awarded 4 
a fifth place in 2005 following Liverpool's win, and Spain was awarded a fifth place in 5 
2015-16 and 2016-17 following Sevilla winning the Europa League. Thirteen seasons 6 
since 2003 have seen a winner from a club in Category A; Spain (7), England (3), Italy 7 
(2), Germany (1). Category B's Portugal (1) is the only outlier.   8 
 9 
RESULTS  10 
The results section is split into three sections. First is the revenue distribution (club, 11 
national association and sub-categories); second, the performance analysis based on 12 
Round Reached (RR) calculations, and third; representation (club entries and playing 13 
data). The paper has outlined competitive balance although did not aim to test it per se, as 14 
competitive imbalance in the competition has been highlighted by previous studies. The 15 
analysis is looking to examine the representation and rewards attached to the Champions 16 
League, and discuss what the proposed qualification changes may have.  17 
 18 
Revenue distribution 19 
Analysis of the financial information since 2003-04 outlines that the distribution of 20 
revenue from the Champions League appears to be disproportionate. The four national 21 
associations in Category A (see Table 1) have taken 61% of the Champions League 22 
revenue since 2003, ranging from 58% to 65% per season. However, as the revenue 23 
streams have significantly increased, the absolute difference is much greater. In 2003-04 24 
and 2012-13 when the Category A market share was its lowest (58% and 59% 25 
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respectively) the overall revenue distributed was very different; €416.4m in 2003-04 1 
compared to €904.6m in 2012-13. In 2016-17 the market share for Category A 2 
associations was €823.4m of the €1.33bn allocated, only €81m less than the overall 3 
competition revenue four years prior. Revenue has risen 321% since 2003-04, but the 4 
Category A share has risen 340% compared to the others categories (294%). As overall 5 
revenues continue to increase, having a more equal spread (leading to a lower proportion 6 
for the top clubs, as proposed by UEFAs revisions) may still result in an increased 7 
amount for Category A clubs if the overall revenues continue to rise. 8 
 9 
Table 2 Revenue distribution by category  10 
 11 
Table 2 outlines the total revenue allocated in the current financial model. It shows that 12 
the total revenue received by clubs from Spain, England, Italy and Germany is €6.61bn 13 
with the greatest disparity with regard to market share. Category A clubs, with 44% of all 14 
entries, received €3.39bn from this element (68% of the value).  There has been some 15 
movement by UEFA in terms of looking at a more even distribution of revenue prior to 16 
the 2018-19 changes, although it could not be described as a major re-balance of revenue 17 
allocation. The increase in the statutory revenue for qualifying (where all clubs get the 18 
same each year) has risen by 368% and the statutory element has increased from 28% of 19 
the total revenue allocation to 32% since 2003-04. The performance allocation (linked to 20 
games won and round reached) value has increased by a similar proportion (363%). 21 
Although the market pool has risen by a smaller proportion since 2003-04 (274%) and 22 
has a decreasing overall proportion of the revenue (from 50% to 42%), this revenue 23 
stream has increased the most in absolute value since 2003-04 (by €356m). The new 24 
financial model from the 2018-19 season aims to increase payments for performance, and 25 
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decrease payments for market pool, and also remove national association influence, and 1 
this will be important to monitor to assess any shift in the revenue distribution by club 2 
and association. Figure 1 outlines the differences in average revenue (statutory, 3 
performance and market pool) by category (Table 1).  4 
 5 
Figure 1 Revenue distribution and range by category 6 
 7 
Figure 2 outlines a clear pattern from the revenue distribution, with the statutory payment 8 
averages across the categories relatively similar, apart from Category F where it is higher. 9 
This is because the four qualifiers in this category competed in later editions of the 10 
competition when the statutory revenue pot was higher (2009-10, Debreceni, Hungary; 11 
2014-15, NK Maribor, Slovenia; 2015-16, Astana, Kazakhstan; 2016-17, Legia Warsaw, 12 
Poland). The performance pot sees a decline as the number of entries decrease, i.e. 13 
demonstrating that the leagues qualifying more teams win more games and progress to 14 
the later rounds more frequently, and receive performance payments for this.  The main 15 
disparity is the market pool allocation, which shows English, Spanish, German and Italian 16 
clubs receiving, on average, at least more than double any other club.  17 
 18 
The clubs at the top of the Deloitte financial reports (2017) with the highest commercial 19 
revenues domestically (from TV deals, merchandise, ticket sales etc.) are also those in 20 
receipt of enhanced payments from the Champions League market pool. This is a benefit 21 
from the point of view of FFP, with an increase in their ability to maximise transfer 22 
activity and recruit higher quality players within the FFP limits. The combination of 23 
domestic revenue models (from imbalanced competitions) and Champions League 24 
revenue for a small proportion of Europe's clubs is position effectively allows the elite 25 
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clubs to "lock-in" their position at the top of the game in financial terms. For example, 1 
although the G14 group of 18 elite clubs was disbanded in 2008 (BBC, 2008), these 18 2 
clubs have taken €5.46bn (51%) of all Champions League revenue since 2003, and 3 
accounted for 39% of all Champions' League group stage entries. 4 
 5 
There is a strong argument that the elite clubs receiving the income are those creating the 6 
value, i.e. the "product" on the pitch which is creating the revenue. The revenue 7 
distribution is heavily in favour of clubs from England (19%), Spain (16%), Italy (14%) 8 
and Germany (13%). Monitoring this distribution beyond 2018-19 with the quota 9 
revisions will be a key measurement of UEFAs desire for 'fairer distribution'.  10 
 11 
Performance 12 
The scoring system used for the analysis in this section is outlined in the method and 13 
demonstrates that the two countries with the most teams (Spain and England) have the 14 
highest cumulative Round Reached score (163 and 155 respectively) and the highest 15 
average (2.96 and 2.82). Table 3 quantifies the Round Reached performance by clubs 16 
with a minimum Round Reached score of 10. 17 
 18 
Table 3 Round Reached (RR) points (non-Category A clubs italicised) 19 
 20 
Table 3 demonstrates that the four highest scoring clubs (in terms of RR total points) 21 
received €2.08bn (19.3%) of all revenue distributed by UEFA since 2003 (group 1), with 22 
twelve other clubs (groups 2 and 3) receiving €2.19bn (20.3%) and €1.33bn (12.4%) 23 
respectively. Only Porto, Benfica (Portugal), PSG (France) and PSV Eindhoven 24 
(Netherlands) are in this group from outside Category 1 national associations. With the 25 
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financial rewards increasing for progressing through the rounds in the competition (i.e. 1 
performance related revenue for reaching later rounds) there is a structure of reward in 2 
place. However, the market pool share is where the disparities between clubs and 3 
associations develop. Group 1 clubs, Barcelona, Real Madrid (Spain), Bayern Munich 4 
(Germany), Chelsea (England) received €986m in market pool (averaging €246m per 5 
club) which is 20% of the total share. The top 16 clubs (groups 1-3 in Table 3) received 6 
€2.77bn in market pool payments (an average of €173m per club) and 56% of all the 7 
market pool revenue.  8 
 9 
The data also outlines that some clubs from certain national associations appear to be 10 
disadvantaged in the current system, with clubs frequently qualifying faring worse in 11 
terms of the revenue allocation due to the market pool distribution model. FC Porto (nine-12 
time Champions in the sample timeframe, with one Champions League win) and 13 
competing in 13 of the 14 competitions are one example. Porto have the 8th highest 14 
Round Reached (RR) score (28), and 21st highest average score of 2.15 (i.e. frequently 15 
going beyond the group stages). However, they have received only €16.7m per 'entry', an 16 
average market pool of €2.9m per entry and €216.6m overall. Compare this to AS Roma, 17 
for example, who have a lower overall RR total score (14), a lower RR average (2.00), 18 
and have competed in only 7 editions (none as champions), yet received €34.7m per entry, 19 
a market pool share of €22.9m per entry and €242.7m overall. Almost half the volume of 20 
entries by a club going beyond the Round of 16 on only two occasions has generated AS 21 
Roma €26.1m more in revenue than a club which has won the competition and advanced 22 
out of the group stages on nine occasions.  23 
 24 
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An example of English clubs' weighting being disproportionate is Leicester City's one 1 
entry and run to the quarter final in 2016-17. This generated revenue of €81.7m 2 
(including a market pool of €49.1m) due to the high share allocated to the English league 3 
(and as league winners), which is the highest "by entry" value in the sample by a 4 
considerable distance. This is more than clubs with greater domestic success and more 5 
competition entries; for example €11m higher than Anderlecht (7 entries, 5 as champions), 6 
€14m more than Rangers (5 entries, 4 as champions) and €19m more than Panathinaikos 7 
(5 entries, 2 as Champions).  8 
 9 
These are examples of inequality in the revenue allocation model between leagues with 10 
higher coefficients and more qualification places. The change to score individual club 11 
coefficient may move this disparity further as the frequent qualifiers will increase and 12 
retain their own coefficient score. Five clubs from the four main leagues (Liverpool, AS 13 
Roma, Bayer Leverkusen, Schalke and Sevilla) with 30 entries between them have 14 
received €858.9m in revenue without winning their domestic league since 2003. These 15 
clubs have qualified automatically ahead of league winners from national associations 16 
with lower coefficient scores and thus fewer qualification places or have to meet the 17 
requirement of navigating up to three qualifying rounds.  18 
 19 
The data indicates that significant amounts of the revenue allocation are awarded to a 20 
relatively small group of clubs from the Category A nations. UEFAs proposed changes to 21 
the payment structure and entry allocations underpins their rationale of creating "fair 22 
competition and fair distribution", although the efficacy of this can be questioned. An 23 
unintended outcome from the quota changes may be that representation decreases.  24 
 25 
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Representation: Clubs and playing data 1 
In 14 seasons, clubs from Category A leagues have qualified an average of 14 clubs per 2 
season, with a maximum of 15 entries (on six occasions) and a minimum of 13 (on four 3 
occasions). Of the 32 group stage entrants, 16 teams per season (on average) have been 4 
league winners, ranging from 15 to 18. Each season has seen an average of 17 national 5 
associations represented with a range 15 to 18. The quota changes to allocate 16 6 
guaranteed places for the top four national associations will lower this average. The 16 7 
guaranteed places for England, Spain, Italy and Germany, plus up to three places for 8 
France and Portugal and up to two for Russia, Netherlands, Turkey, potentially allocates 9 
28 of the 32 spaces, if all clubs navigate the qualifying round(s). With the Europa League 10 
winners qualifying for the following seasons' Champions League, this is an additional 11 
factor. There is a strong correlation between the number of entries and two key 12 
measurements, first the total Round Reached points (r=0.902) and second the overall 13 
revenue (r=0.882). 14 
 15 
Overall, 31 different national associations have supplied teams for the Champions league 16 
since 2003 (as listed in Table 1); and players from 109 countries have been represented in 17 
the competition from all continents. European players account for 73% of all appearances 18 
made and minutes played in the competition, with players from South America the other 19 
main supplier (19%), followed by African players (6%), Asian (1%), North/Central 20 
America (1%) and Oceania/Non-FIFA member associations (<0.05%). The 21 
representation figures vary by national association, with the leading nations over-22 
represented in terms of fixtures played to teams entered (Spain, England, Germany, Italy 23 
and France), with all other nations under-represented.  24 
 25 
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In terms of playing opportunities for own association players, the majority of the leading 1 
nations are under-represented, although the degree of disparity is considerable. Spanish 2 
clubs have played 14.9% of all the Champions League fixtures, and Spanish players 3 
account for 9.4% of all minutes played. English players, with a similar proportion of 4 
fixtures played (14.7%) have a much lower representation of minutes played (3.9%). 5 
Germany (10.9% of fixtures, 6.2% of minutes) and Italy (10.9% of fixtures, 5.5% of 6 
minutes) are also under-represented but not to the same extent. French and Dutch players 7 
are over-represented, and Belgian players have equal representation. Some national 8 
associations with more qualifying places in the Champions League have had issues 9 
qualifying for major tournaments, some of which have an under-representation of players, 10 
for example England missed Euro 2008. Other high profile associations include 11 
Netherlands missing Euro 2016 and, alongside Italy, did not qualify for the World Cup in 12 
Russia 2018.  13 
 14 
Table 4 Representation by league host (min. 10 teams qualified) 15 
 16 
Overall, 69% of all appearances in the Champions League and 70% of all minutes played 17 
have been generated by players from the 31 countries supplying teams. Two non-18 
European countries dominate the remaining 30%, Brazil and Argentina, suppling 15.3% 19 
of all appearances and 15.6% of minutes. Brazil has been the dominant supplier of 20 
players in the competition since 2003 with a higher level of representation than any 21 
individual European country. When looking at the representation by round reached the 22 
picture changes (Table 4).  Players representing the four nations in category 1 accounted 23 
for 12% of all minutes played in the group stage. For the Round of 16 and Quarter Finals 24 
this rose to 30%. For Semi-Finals and Finals, 45% of all minutes played were by players 25 
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from Category 1 nations. Spanish (with 19%) and Brazilian players (with 10%) have 1 
dominated playing time in semi-finals and finals.   2 
 3 
UEFAs core rationale for the quota changes in the Champions League is "the right of all 4 
associations and their clubs to compete in Europe's elite club competitions"; although this 5 
may be weakened by effectively limiting the associations represented in the group stage 6 
competition. There may be implications for migration patterns if it is more difficult for 7 
the better players from lower ranked leagues to access the Champions League without 8 
transferring, and there may be associated impacts on the selling clubs.   9 
 10 
Expected and unintended outcomes? 11 
The logic behind changes to qualification quotas and revenue allocation, in terms of 12 
expected outcomes, is outlined in Figure 2. The analysis of the previous 14 years 13 
compared to UEFAs remit and rationale for change creates a misalignment between 14 
UEFAs expected outcomes and the potential 'unintended outcomes' attached to the 15 
qualification changes. 16 
 17 
Figure 2 Logic Model outlining UEFAs expectations from allocation changes 18 
 19 
DISCUSSION 20 
The increase in commercial value of the Champions League over the last decade, driven 21 
by media deals and elevated global interest, can be (significantly if not wholly) attributed 22 
to the presence of Europe's elite clubs, and the world's best players, routinely competing 23 
against each other. However, based on the financial data presented here, questions remain 24 
whether there is a need for UEFA (and potentially league administrators too) to do more 25 
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in terms of regulating financial rewards from the competition. The dichotomy is around 1 
whether UEFA need to maintain a 'competitive' competition (in the light of competitive 2 
imbalance) and create representation from a greater range of member nations, or facilitate 3 
the demands of the elite clubs and protect against a breakaway super league. Evidence of 4 
competitive imbalance in the group stage and in domestic leagues underpins this, and 5 
there is an argument to suggest that the entry allocation changes may lead to unintended 6 
outcomes (Figure 1). Questions remain around how the quota changes will impact on 7 
future revenue and representation.  8 
 9 
The objectives of this paper were to assess financial rewards, performance and playing 10 
time since 2003. The headline figures demonstrate a competition skewed in favour of a 11 
small proportion of individual clubs and leagues. The discussion section focuses on each 12 
of the three areas in turn based on the research findings.  13 
 14 
(1) Representation in the competition (teams and players);  15 
The growth in revenue generation from the Champions League is based on demand from 16 
broadcasters wanting to showcase Europe's elite clubs. Extending the range of qualifying 17 
nations has the potential to reduce the quality of the 'product' and in turn reduce rights 18 
fees for future deals if representation is widened and leads to some big clubs missing out 19 
in favour of 'smaller' clubs. This may affect demand and potentially lead to a greater level 20 
of competitive imbalance in the group stages (as found by Plumley and Flint, 2015). The 21 
quota changes decrease the competition places available for those outside the top four 22 
leagues and increases the barriers to entry for clubs from lower ranked leagues, and this 23 
does not align with some of UEFAs core principles. 24 
 25 
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As previous research (e.g. Vamplew 2017; Dabscheck, 2018) demonstrated, sports 1 
leagues can gravitate toward 'cartel-like' behaviour through collective agreements and 2 
require the cooperation of others. For UEFA, as governors of the European wide 3 
competitions, tightening quota places to smaller leagues may be an attempt to protect the 4 
brand of the Champions League in the context of a European Super League 'break-away' 5 
having been discussed. Although UEFAs approach to this threat (increasing the 6 
guaranteed spaces for higher ranked leagues) might appear as a move which is anti-7 
competitive, it may result in a beneficial situation for some stakeholders via increased 8 
revenue (and profits) for all competition participants. How (or if) this trickles down to 9 
non-participants is highly questionable. If the same clubs are in receipt of the revenues 10 
and the barriers to entry are raised, the chances for other clubs to participate diminish and 11 
the spending power of the richest clubs would potentially increase, and have greater 12 
protection through quotas for guarant ed entry. 13 
 14 
This is where UEFA are caught between meeting the needs of their leading clubs and 15 
leagues which generate the revenues and representing all 55 member associations (and 16 
clubs) as part of their governance responsibilities.  It can be argued that increased revenue 17 
generation (if distributed more equally) can benefit more leagues/clubs in Europe, and the 18 
revised distribution model accompanying the quota changes may be part of the attempt to 19 
achieve this. It is likely that the revenue proportions achieved by the leading clubs will 20 
remain significantly higher than the amounts available to others, as was the case between 21 
2003 and 2017. 22 
 23 
Greater (and increasing) revenues continuing to go to the same clubs, protected by 24 
individual coefficient rankings and more restricted access to qualify the Champions 25 
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League for new entrants, creates conditions facilitating 'cartel like behaviour' as cited 1 
earlier. The clubs most likely to qualify through their domestic leagues are amongst those 2 
in receipt of the largest share of their domestic TV rights, higher value commercial deals 3 
etc. therefore the financial disparity in European club football may continue to grow 4 
wider and be monopolised by a small collection of clubs. Whether this scenario is healthy 5 
for the longer term sustainability and demand is questionable, as movement towards this 6 
scenario have been facilitated by UEFA. The competition has generated record revenues 7 
but these changes may not be welcome by clubs and leagues on the outside.  8 
 9 
(2) Performance in the competition 10 
An area of concern for UEFA is if the uncertainty of outcome in the competition 11 
diminishes, as this may have implications for demand. Since 2003, few clubs from 12 
outside the top four leagues have advanced to the latter stages of the Champions League 13 
and none to the final since 2003-04. Schokkaert and Swinnen (2014) found that 14 
qualification from the earlier rounds has become more predictable over time but the latter 15 
stages of the competition have become less predictable. It the competition wants to avoid 16 
having an annual roster of similar teams, increasing the guaranteed entries is a potentially 17 
inhibiting factor.  18 
 19 
The Champions League is an extremely strong brand, although it is not a true reflection 20 
of the competitions composition with three of the top twenty highest scoring clubs (based 21 
on RR) having not won their domestic league since 2003. Group stage places for league 22 
winners have been replaced by third/fourth placed teams from stronger leagues and with 23 
more guaranteed spaces, this scenario will increase with 16 guaranteed places from 2018-24 
19. A more representative spread of national association winners being included 25 
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automatically may well exacerbate the issue of competitive imbalance by including 1 
(potentially) weaker teams, and is a risk from a commercial perspective. Having fewer 2 
clubs from the stronger leagues in the Champions League would not be popular 3 
commercially. However, restricting the supply route into the elite competition may have 4 
wider impacts on player migration patterns as an unintended consequence. For example, 5 
2015-16 saw five Spanish sides competing but none from Scotland, Romania, 6 
Switzerland, Czech Republic, Denmark, all of which are in Category D - see Table 1.  7 
Increasing automatic spaces for the top four leagues will make those leagues look even 8 
more appealing to overseas players and the best players from weaker European leagues.  9 
It may also impact on the transfer system (where talented players from non-Category A 10 
leagues are the subject of transfer activity) in order to access the competition, particularly 11 
in the area of youth development, as other studies have shown this to be more prominent 12 
at an early age (for example, Bond et al, 2017; Poli et al, 2016). If the same elite clubs 13 
qualify they will retain both high revenues, transfer budgets and their individual 14 
coefficient score, effectively creating a "lock-in". For UEFA to meet the desire for "fair 15 
competition and distribution", a more representative Champions League would be 16 
required. This is not on the planning horizon based on UEFAs structural changes for 17 
2018-2021, and may weaken the commercial strength of the competition in the short-term. 18 
 19 
(3) Revenue/prize money allocation. 20 
Clubs in category A have received €6.6bn in revenue (2003-2017), €3.39bn of which 21 
from the market pool element, with an average of €17.1m per entry, more than double 22 
category B (€8.54m). The top 8 clubs in terms of total RR points (Real Madrid, 23 
Barcelona, Bayern Munich, Chelsea, Juventus, Arsenal, Manchester United and AC 24 
Milan) have received 35% of all Champions League revenue since 2003 (€3.8bn). This 25 
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shows the revenue distribution is concentrated on a small group of elite clubs and, 1 
according to UEFAs structural changes, is an area UEFA are attempting to alter. UEFAs 2 
proposal to recalculate the distribution of the market pool element are aimed at meeting 3 
the principles of "fair competition, and fair distribution" (UEFA, 2016a). With 69% of all 4 
market pool payments going to clubs from England, Spain, Germany and Italy, this is an 5 
important element of the revenue distribution allocation model. UEFAs attempt to 6 
redistribute this part of the distribution model from 2018-19 has the potential to increase 7 
the revenue share for others but only those entering the competition. Changes to the 8 
revenue distribution models from 2018-19 are yet to be implemented and scrutinised, 9 
although a decrease in qualification places for those outside the top four leagues may 10 
have the opposite affect.  11 
 12 
UEFA outline "an increase in payments to clubs and national associations knocked out in 13 
the qualifying phase of the competition" as a focal point of the rule changes, although 14 
they will require further scrutiny over time to assess its efficacy. For example, if the 15 
national weighting is removed, any 'new entrants' i.e. teams breaking into the 16 
qualification spaces in their domestic league, even the Category A associations, may be 17 
penalised as they will have a low/no individual coefficient score in the new system. 18 
Those teams frequently qualifying will retain a higher individual club coefficient and thus 19 
(potentially) retain a higher market share of the revenues available. When discussing if 20 
the new format will see larger clubs from larger countries benefitting more, UEFA stated 21 
that the revised model for 2018-19 has a guarantee to increase payments to those knocked 22 
out in qualifying and for sporting success, with less allocated for being in a large TV 23 
market. However, this does not outline how total payments or proportions will change 24 
across the wider network. 25 
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 1 
Conclusion 2 
The data analysis has demonstrated the extent to which the major clubs and leagues in 3 
Europe benefit from the Champions League, in terms of revenue, competition success, 4 
representation and playing opportunity. The value of quantifying the revenues attached to 5 
the competition allows us to identify policy implications for the future of the competition 6 
through the lens of UEFAs remit. The success of the competition is based on the big 7 
clubs playing against each other as this generates the demand and commercial revenue. 8 
The move to protect more places for the top four leagues raises the barriers to entry for 9 
clubs outside of these four leagues, and may result in the revenue pot being retained by an 10 
elite group of clubs. The logic model (Figure 1) outlines potential unintended outcomes 11 
from quota changes linked to competitive balance, meeting the needs of all 55 member 12 
nations and protecting the commercial value. These areas all create a conflict for UEFA, 13 
although they identify that competitive balance is one of their greatest challenges. The 14 
President is aware of the issues attached to the generation of record-breaking revenues 15 
leading to an accumulation of wealth for a select group of clubs (Reuters, 2018). UEFAs 16 
proposed measures to re-balance revenue distribution are unlikely to achieve this, 17 
appearing on the surface to do the opposite 18 
 19 
This intervention from UEFA differs from their other notable interventions (Financial 20 
Fair Play and the home-grown rule) in that the more powerful clubs would be more on 21 
board with it than the other pieces of legislation as it doesn’t impinge on their activity. It 22 
effectively increases the level of protection for the top four leagues by effectively raising 23 
the barriers to entry for other nations' clubs by reducing their allocation. Other UEFA 24 
interventions can be (and have been shown to be) circumvented to some degree by clubs 25 
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but this policy is more likely to be welcomed by both the larger clubs and the larger 1 
associations, unlike FFP.  2 
 3 
Where these research findings fit against UEFAs wider remit of governance is a grey area. 4 
The commercial value of the Champions League is driven by the clubs TV rights holders 5 
and global audiences want to see the top clubs competing. Therefore one argument is that 6 
this rule helps European football from a commercial perspective by ensuring more of the 7 
biggest clubs from the most successful leagues (by coefficient rank) enter the group 8 
stages. To widen opportunities for other nations/clubs and achieve a more equal 9 
representation across Europe the rule change is prohibitive. From the perspective of 10 
widening representation, achieving this may have a detrimental impact on the competitive 11 
balance and commercial value which is an issue for UEFA. For fans, players and owners 12 
at clubs already in receipt of high revenues from the Champions League, changes which 13 
threaten this would not be welcome. For the many clubs and fans that aspire to compete 14 
in the Champions League, the creation of a 'super league' or other interventions which 15 
increase the barriers to entry to enter the existing competition would prove unpopular.  16 
 17 
For UEFA, tasking itself with delivering "fair competition and fair distribution", 18 
questions remain. Symanski's assertions around reducing the level of competitive balance 19 
if a smaller pool of teams dominate leading to a detrimental impact on the overall interest 20 
in a competition is a pertinent point. This may not concern some key stakeholders 21 
(clubs/leagues) in European football (or even UEFA), with clubs unlikely to embrace a 22 
truly fair distribution model or welcome new entrants that can threaten their position. The 23 
suggested recommendations for UEFA in light of the challenges discussed here include 24 
the following. First, monitor future revenue distribution under the revised financial model 25 
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to ascertain the impact of these revisions across Europe (leagues and clubs). Second is 1 
developing a greater level of balance between their commercial commitments (to 2 
sponsors and to appease the biggest clubs) and their role as the governing body for all 3 
clubs/leagues in European football. For example, ensuring a greater proportion of league 4 
winners are included in the group stages, not excluded in favour of fourth/fifth placed 5 
teams from stronger leagues. Third is ensuring that any Champions League strategies 6 
they develop in the future are clearly underpinned by their self-proclaimed notion of "fair 7 
competition and fair distribution". Creating and implementing a strategy for the future 8 
which aims to prevent the competitive imbalance and financial disparity already present 9 
from becoming greater should be key considerations.   10 
 11 
REFERENCES 12 
Barajas, Á., & Rodríguez, P. (2014). Spanish football in need of financial therapy: Cut 13 
expenses and inject capital. International Journal of Sport Finance, 9(1), 73. 14 
 15 
BBC (2008). G14 to disband after compromise [online]. Retrieved January 4, 2018, 16 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/europe/7190186.stm  17 
 18 
Bevan, C. (2013). "How UEFA’s seeding system helps Arsenal and hinders Celtic" 19 
[online]. Retrieved 28 March, 2018, from www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/23680545. 20 
 21 
Bond, A., Widdop, P. & Parnell, D. (2016). A networked view of the international 22 
mobility of minors in football, The Football Collective [online]. Retrieved 15 March, 23 
2018, from https://footballcollective.org.uk/2016/12/17/a-networked-view-of-the-24 
international-mobility-of-minors-in-football/  25 
 26 
Bullough, S., Moore, R., Goldsmith, S., & Edmondson, L. (2016). Player migration 27 
and opportunity: examining the efficacy of the UEFA home-grown rule in six 28 
European football leagues. International Journal of Sport Science and Coaching, 29 
11(5), 662-672. 30 
 31 
Page 30 of 39
URL: https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rmle
Managing Sport and Leisure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Buraimo, B., & Simmons, R. (2008). Do sports fans really value uncertainty of outcome? 1 
Evidence from the English Premier League. International Journal of Sport Finance, 2 
3(3), 146–155. 3 
 4 
Dabscheck, B. (2018). Of ‘FIFA and its courtesans’: blowing the whistle on Australia's 5 
failed World Cup bid. Soccer & Society, 1-6. 6 
 7 
Deloitte (2017). Planet Football Money League (2017), Sports Business Group, 8 
January 2017 [online]. Retrieved January 4, 2018, from 9 
https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/sports-business-group/articles/deloitte-football-10 
money-league.html 11 
 12 
Gratton, C. & Solberg, H.A. (2007). The economics of sports broadcasting. London: 13 
Routledge. 14 
 15 
Gratton, C. (2000). The peculiar economics of English professional football. Soccer & 16 
Society, 1(1), 11-28. 17 
 18 
Holt, M. (2007). The ownership and control of Elite club competition in European 19 
football. Soccer & Society, 8(1), 50-67. 20 
 21 
Independent, (2016). Champions League: Premier League to get four group-stage spots 22 
along with Spanish, German and Italian leagues [online]. Retrieved January 4, 2018, 23 
from http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/european/champions-league-premier-24 
league-to-get-four-group-stage-spots-along-with-spanish-german-and-italian-25 
a7210881.html  26 
 27 
Lago, U., Simmons, R., & Szymanski, S. (2006). The financial crisis in European 28 
football: An introduction. Journal of Sports Economics, 7, 3-12. 29 
 30 
Palomino F., & Rigotti L. (2000). The Sport League’s dilemma: Competitive Balance 31 
versus Incentives to Win [online]. Retrieved 12 May, 2018, from 32 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=250793 33 
 34 
Pawlowski, T., Breuer, C., & Hovemann, A. (2010). Top Clubs' Performance and the 35 
Competitive Situation in European Domestic Football Competitions. Journal of Sports 36 
Economics, 11(2), 186-202. 37 
 38 
Pawlowski, T., & Anders, C. (2012). Stadium attendance in German professional 39 
football – The (un) importance of uncertainty of outcome reconsidered. Applied 40 
Economics Letters, 19(16), 1553-1556. 41 
Page 31 of 39
URL: https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rmle
Managing Sport and Leisure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 1 
Plumley, D.J., & Flint, S. (2015). The UEFA Champions League: maintaining the status 2 
quo? Team Performance Management, 21 (5/6), 247-258. 3 
 4 
Poli, R., Ravenel, L., & Besson, R. (2016). The international mobility of minors in 5 
football, CIES Football Observatory Monthly Report No. 20, Neuchâtel, December 6 
[online]. Retrieved 2 March, 2018, from 7 
www.footballobservatory.com/IMG/sites/mr/mr20/en/  8 
 9 
Ramchandani, G., (2012). Competitiveness of the English Premier League (1992-2010) 10 
and ten European football leagues (2010). International Journal of Performance Analysis 11 
in Sport, 12(2), 346-360. 12 
 13 
Ramchandani, G., Plumley, D., Boyes, S., & Wilson, R. (2018). A longitudinal and 14 
comparative analysis of competitive balance in five European football leagues, 15 
Team Performance Management: An International Journal. 16 
 17 
Reuters (2018). UEFA president will fight tooth and nail to restore balance [online]. 18 
Retrieved 5th April, 2018, from https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-uefa/uefa-19 
president-will-fight-tooth-and-nail-to-restore-balance-idUKKCN1GA134  20 
 21 
Schokkaert, J., & Swinnen, J. (2014). Uncertainty of Outcome Is Higher in the 22 
Champions League Than in the European Cup. Journal of Sports Economics, 17(2), 115-23 
147. 24 
 25 
Szymanski, S. (2001). Income inequality, competitive balance and the attractiveness of 26 
team sports: some evidence and a natural experiment from English soccer. The 27 
Economic Journal, 111(469), 69-84. 28 
 29 
Szymanski, S. (2003). Incentives and competitive balance in team sports. European 30 
Sport Management Quarterly, 3(1), 11-30. 31 
 32 
Szymanski, S., & Késenne, S. (2004). Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in 33 
team sports. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 52(1), 165-177. 34 
 35 
Telegraph (2009). Real Madrid's Florentino Perez reveals 'European Super League' 36 
ambition [online]. Retrieved April 5, 2018, from 37 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/european/5748825/Real-Madrids-38 
Florentino-Perez-reveals-European-Super-League-ambition.html 39 
 40 
Page 32 of 39
URL: https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rmle
Managing Sport and Leisure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
UEFA (2015a). About UEFA [online]. Retrieved March 26, 2018, from 1 
https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/ 2 
 3 
UEFA (2016a). UEFA club competition format from 2018: Q&A [online]. Retrieved 4 
November 22, 2017, from 5 
http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=2398611.html#/ 6 
 7 
UEFA (2016b). Evolution of UEFA club competitions from 2018 [online]. Retrieved 8 
November 22, 2017, from 9 
http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=2398899.html#/ 10 
 11 
UEFA (2016c). Library, Financial reports [online]. Retrieved November 29, 2017, 12 
from 13 
https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/documentlibrary/aboutuefa/financialreports/index.htm14 
l  15 
 16 
UEFA (2017). 2016/17 UEFA Champions League financial distribution [online]. 17 
Retrieved, November 29, 2017, from https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-18 
uefa/news/newsid=2510173.html#/  19 
 20 
Vamplew, W. (2017). Creating the English Premier Football League: A Brief Economic 21 
History with Some Possible Lessons for Asian Soccer. The International Journal of the 22 
History of Sport, 1-12. 23 
 24 
Vrooman, J. (2007). Theory of the beautiful game: The unification of European football. 25 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 54(3), 314-354. 26 
 27 
Wilson, R., Ramchandani, G., & Plumley, D. (2018). Parachute payments in English 28 
football: Softening the landing or distorting the balance? Journal of Global Sport 29 
Management, 1-18. 30 
 31 
Page 33 of 39
URL: https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rmle
Managing Sport and Leisure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Table 1 Categorisation of Champions League entries 2003-04 to 2016-17 1 
Category Description No. Leagues League Host (entries) 
A Over 40 entries 4 
Spain (55), England (55), Italy (44), 
Germany (44) 
B 20-39 entries 3 France (37), Portugal (30), Russia (22) 
C 15-19 entries 4 
Ukraine (19), Greece (18), Netherlands (18), 
Turkey (16) 
D 6-14 entries 6 
Belgium (13), Scotland (13), Romania (9), 
Czech Republic (8), Switzerland (8), 
Denmark (8) 
E 2-5 entries 10 
Belarus (5), Croatia, Cyprus, Israel (4) 
Bulgaria, Norway (3), Austria, Sweden, 
Serbia, Slovakia (2) 
F One entry 4 Hungary, Kazakhstan, Slovenia, Poland (1) 
 2 
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Table 2 Revenue distribution by category  1 
Category  
(n, mean) 
Statutory 
(equal share)  
Performance 
Related 
Market Pool TOTAL 
sum  sum  sum  sum mean 
A (198, 14) €1.43bn €1.79bn €3.39bn €6.61bn €33.4m 
B (89, 6) €0.67bn €0.45bn €0.76bn €1.88bn €21.1m 
C (71, 5) €0.47bn €0.19bn €0.47bn €1.13bn €15.9m 
D (55, 4) €0.37bn €0.10bn €0.25bn €0.73bn €13.3m 
E (31, 2) €0.25bn €0.04bn €0.56bn €0.35bn €11.3m 
F (4, <1) €0.05bn €0.01bn €0.01bn €0.07bn €16.9m 
TOTAL (448, 32) €3.25bn €2.58bn €4.95bn €10.78bn €24.1m 
 2 
 3 
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Figure 1 Revenue distribution and range by category 1 
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Table 3 Round Reached (RR) points (non-Category A clubs italicised) 1 
Group Club, RR Points (RR Average)  Financial share 
(1) 40-70 points  
(4 clubs) 
Barcelona 53 (4.08); Real Madrid 49 (3.50);  
Bayern Munich 46 (3.54); Chelsea 43 (3.31) 
Total €2.08bn (19.3%), 
Average €520m        
Market Pool €0.99bn, 
Average €246m 
(2) 25-39 points  
(6 clubs) 
Arsenal 36 (2.57); Manchester United 35 (2.92); 
AC Milan 31 (3.10); Porto 28 (2.15);          
Juventus 27 (2.70); Lyon 25 (2.27) 
Total €2.19bn (20.3%) 
Average €364m        
Market Pool €1.15bn 
Average €192m 
(3) 15-24 points  
(6 clubs) 
Inter Milan 24 (2.67); Liverpool 22 (3.14); 
Atlético Madrid 20 (3.33); Benfica 17 (1.70); 
PSG 15 (2.50); PSV Eindhoven 15 (1.88) 
Total €1.33bn (12.4%) 
Average €222m        
Market Pool €0.63bn 
Average €105m 
(4) 10-14 points  
(13 clubs) 
AS Roma 14 (2.00); Olympiacos 14 (1.27); 
Borussia Dortmund 14 (2.80); Schalke 14 (2.33); 
AS Monaco 14 (3.50); Shakhtar Donetsk 14 
(1.40); Manchester City 12 (2.00); CSKA Moscow 
12 (1.33); Bayer Leverkusen 11 (1.83); Valencia 
CF 11 (1.57); Celtic 11 (1.38); Marseille 10 
(1.43); Dynamo Kiev 10 (1.11) 
Total €2.20bn (20.4%) 
Average €169m        
Market Pool €1.01bn 
Average €77m 
(5) 1-9 points 
(79 clubs) 
All 79 remaining clubs (17 from Category A) 
€2.97bn (27.6%)    
Average €39m          
Market Pool €1.17bn 
Average €15m 
 2 
 3 
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Table 4 Representation by league host (min. 10 teams qualified) 1 
 Teams Fixtures Played Minutes Played % Minutes Played 
League N (%) N (%) N (%) Group  R16/QF SF/Final 
Spain 55 (12.3%) 523 (14.9%) 326,733 (9.4%) 4.6% 9.3% 18.9% 
England 55 (12.3%) 516 (14.7%) 134,767 (3.9%) 1.5% 4.1% 7.9% 
Germany 44 (9.8%) 380 (10.9%) 216,219 (6.2%) 2.8% 8.1% 9.0% 
Italy 44 (9.8%) 381 (10.9%) 189,506 (5.5%) 2.9% 8.2% 4.8% 
France 37 (8.3%) 299 (8.5%) 298,172 (8.6%) 5.9% 10.6% 9.6% 
Portugal 30 (6.7%) 223 (6.4%) 164,712 (4.8%) 4.1% 4.6% 6.3% 
Russia 22 (4.9%) 146 (4.2%) 79,495 (2.3%) 3.5% 2.3% 0.1% 
Ukraine 19 (4.2%) 124 (3.5%) 54,774 (1.6%) 2.7% 1.0% 0.6% 
Greece 18 (4.0%) 116 (3.3%) 63,959 (1.8%) 3.2% 1.5% 0.2% 
Netherlands 18 (4.0%) 124 (3.5%) 127,483 (3.7%) 3.8% 3.4% 4.0% 
Turkey 16 (3.6%) 106 (3.0%) 64,559 (1.9%) 3.3% 1.3% 0.2% 
Belgium 13 (2.9%) 80 (2.3%) 77,978 (2.3%) 3.7% 1.5% 1.0% 
Scotland 13 (2.9%) 86 (2.5%) 34,196 (1.0%) 1.5% 0.8% 0.3% 
Other EUR 64 (14.3%) 396 (11.3%) 692,835 (20%) 32.7% 12.7% 11.7% 
Rest of World NA NA 936,147 (27%) 23.9% 30.5% 25.4% 
TOTAL 448 (100%) 3,500 (100%) 3,461,535 (100%) 100% 100% 100% 
 2 
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Figure 2 Logic Model outlining UEFAs expectations from allocation changes 1 
Inputs  Outputs  
UEFAs 'Expected 
Outcomes' 
 Unintended 
Outcomes? 
       
Altering the 
revenue distribution 
model 
 
Revenue 
distribution values 
by club and 
Association 
 
"Fairer distribution 
of, and calculation 
of coefficients, for 
revenue allocation" 
 
Increased revenues 
for top 4 leagues as 
overall pot grows? 
       
Changing the 
qualification 
allocation for 
Associations, 
ensuring 16 
guaranteed group 
stage places for top 
4 ranked leagues 
 
Range of different 
clubs and 
Associations 
represented  
 
Ensure 
qualification based 
on sporting merit 
 Coefficient scores 
for individual 
clubs, not leagues, 
strengthen top 
clubs' position? 
      
 
Performance of 
Associations and 
clubs competing 
 
Improving and 
protecting the 
competitive balance 
and notion of fair 
competition 
 Reduced 
competitive balance 
with changed 
qualification 
quotas? 
      
 
Range of 
representation of 
playing 
opportunities 
 
"Right of all 
Associations and 
their clubs to 
compete in 
Europe's elite club 
competition" 
 
Decreased 
representation by 
National 
Association / range 
of clubs? 
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